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COMMENTS
in which, as a matter of complete speculation, a landowner dis-
poses of his mineral interest to a person who has no intention of
developing the property and retains an economic interest running
for the life of the property in addition to the cash received upon
execution of the contract. In such a situation, both parties really
intend a sale, and both realize that there is no present prospect
of development. It would seem unfair and totally unrealistic
under these circumstances to cause the entire proceeds to be
taxed as ordinary income subject to depletion merely because
the transferor retains an economic interest running for the life
of the property; the transaction should be taxed as what it clearly
is, a sale. Therefore, it is respectfully suggested that when the
federal courts are, in the future, presented with the problem of
whether a particular transaction is a sale or a lease, the realities
of the situation should govern the outcome rather than the
unbending economic interest test. This is nothing more than an
application of the maxim that substance rather than form should
control federal tax consequences.
Chris A. Verret
UNINSURED MOTORIST COVERAGE IN LOUISIANA
By Act 187 of 1962, the Louisiana Insurance Code was
amended to require that all automobile liability insurance poli-
cies delivered or issued for delivery in Louisiana contain an un-
insured motorist provision.1 Under such provision, the insured,
when injured by an uninsured motorist, can recover from his
own insurer damages for bodily injury, sickness, disease, or
death to the same extent that he would be legally entitled to
recover from the uninsured motorist. However, certain policies
are not required to have uninsured motorist coverage. As pro-
vided in the statute, the insured may validly reject such cover-
age.2 Further, the statute does not apply to policies issued
1. LA. R.S. 22:1406D (Supp. 1962). Although there should be little differ-
ence in wording from policy to policy, there is such a possibility, especially
if out of state cases or treatises are examined. Because the uninsured mo-
torist provision is a contract, the wording generally governs and a difference
in wording may have great Impact. Therefore, care should be exercised In
studying the wording of each policy.
2. Id. D(1) reads in part: "[P]rovided, however, that the coverage re-
quired under this section shall not be applicable where any Insured named
In the policy shall reject the coverage." Soileau v. Hartford Accident &
Indem. Co., 182 So.2d 76 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1966). As this Is the only case in
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before its effective date,s or delivered or issued for delivery
outside of Louisiana,4 or issued by a surplus line insurer.5
This Comment is designed to examine the jurisprudential
interpretations of the uninsured motorist provision in this state.
In this regard there are two points which should be kept in mind.
First, the purpose of this statute is to afford a person injured by
a negligent uninsured motorist the protection to which he would
be entitled if he were injured in an accident caused by an auto-
mobile covered by a standard liability insurance policy.6 Second,
all insurance policies are contracts; therefore, the wording of the
policy should govern the result, unless the provision is prohibited
by statute or public policy.7
Initial Requirements for Recovery
There are several requirements which must be met before
an injured party can recover under the uninsured motorist pro-
vision. The initial requirement is that the provisions of the policy
Louisiana treating rejection of coverage, apparently there is no problem of
attempts by insurers to defeat the purpose of the statute through the use
of rejections.
3. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Rambin, 185 So.2d 851 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1966);
Pierce v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 184 So.2d 241 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1966).
4. Ricardo v. American Indem. Co., 201 So.2d 145 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1967).
Here the policy was issued in Texas while the plaintiff was a domiciliary of
Texas, so the Louisiana statute did not apply. Of course, if a policy Issued
outside of Louisiana does contain uninsured motorist coverage, whether
voluntarily or by compulsory statute, the Louisiana courts will not hesitate
to give effect to the clause. Morgan v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 195
So.2d 648 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1967); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Rambin, 185 So.2d
851 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1966).
5. Barrett v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 226 So.2d 74 (La. App. 3d
Cir. 1969). This case was cited with approval in The Work of the Louisiana
Appellate Courts for the 1969-1970 Term-Insurance, 31 LA. L. Rzv. 288, 290
(1971).
6. "The purpose of the statute making uninsured motorist coverage com-
pulsory, it has been said, is to give the same protection to a person injured
by an uninsured motorist as he would have if he had been injured in an acci-
dent caused by an automobile covered by a standard liability insurance
policy." 12 COUCH ON INSURANCE 2d § 45:623 at 570 (1964), cited in Rolling v.
Miller, 233 So.2d 723, 727 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1970).
7. LA. R.S. 22:620A (1950) provides in part: "Any insurer may insert
In its policies any provisions or conditions required by its plan of insurance
or method of operation which are not prohibited by the provisions of this
Code." LaBove v. American Employers Ins. Co., 189 So.2d 315, 318 (La. App.
3d Cir. 1966): "Our jurisprudence is settled that where the language of a
policy Is clear and unambiguous it constitutes the contract between the
parties, which must be enforced as written. Also, in the absence of any
statutory prohibition, the defendant Insurer may impose whatever conditions
it pleases upon its obligations under the policy."
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actually extend coverage to the person injured.8 Basically, pro-
tection is afforded to three groups: first, the named insured and
any relative who is a member of the same household; 9 second,
any other person "occupying" the insured vehicle; and third, any
person entitled to recover for injuries sustained by a member of
the first two groups.10 While the members of the first group are
covered at all times," the members of the second group must be
"occupying" the insured vehicle to be covered.' 2
8. Barrett v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 236 So.2d 900 (La. App.
3d Cir. 1970); Manuel v. American Employers Ins. Co., 228 So.2d 321 (La. App.
3d Cir. 1969); Fidelity Gen. Ins. Co. v. Ripley, 228 So.2d 238 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1969); Rushing v. Allstate Ins. Co., 216 So.2d 875 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1968);
Buswell v. Biles, 205 So.2d 165 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1968); Spencer v. Traders
& Gen. Ins. Co., 171 So.2d 723 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1965).
9. Manuel v. American Employers Ins. Co., 228 So.2d 321 (La. App. 3d
Cir. 1969); Fidelity Gen. Ins. Co. v. Ripley, 228 So.2d 238 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1969). In Ripley, despite the fact that the mother and father were sepa-
rated; that the son lived with the mother most of the time; and that the
father had removed the son's name from the list of drivers on the policy,
the court found the son to be a resident of the father's household. Thus, it
would seem the courts are inclined to a liberal construction of household
residency.
10. The standard coverage clause provides: "Each of the following is an
Insured under this insurance to the extent set forth below:
"(a) the named insured and any designated insured and, while residents
of the same household, the spouse and relatives of either;
"(b) any other person while occupying an insured highway vehicle; and
"(c) any person with respect to damages he is entitled to recover because
of bodily injury to which this insurance applies sustained by an insured
under (a) or (b) above." N. RISORD & J. AUSTIN, AUTOMOBILE LIABILITY INSUR-
ANCE CASES 288 (Supp. 1967).
11. See Manuel v. American Employers Ins. Co., 228 So.2d 321 (La. App.
3d Cir. 1969) (son of the named insured was a passenger In a car hit by an
uninsured motorist); Fidelity Gen. Ins. Co. v. Ripley, 228 So.2d 238 (La. App.
3d Cir. 1969) (son of the named insured was a passenger in a car which was
wrecked by an uninsured motorist driver). Both courts allowed recovery
under the uninsured motorist provisions.
However, the coverage usually does not extend to a vehicle which is
owned by the insured, but not Insured under the policy. See, e.g., Barrett
v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 236 So.2d 900 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1970);
Rushing v. Allstate Ins. Co., 216 So.2d 875, 876 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1968), In
which the policy provided: "This policy does not apply . . . to bodily Injury
to an insured while occupying an automobile (other than an Insured auto-
mobile) owned by the named insured .... "; Spencer v. Traders & Gen. Ins.
Co., 171 So.2d 723 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1965).
12. The standard uninsured motorist provision defines this requirement
as follows: "'[Oiccupying' means in or upon or entering Into or alighting
from . . . ." N. RISJORD & J. AUSTIN, AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE CASES 290 (Supp.
1967). For an application of this test, see Box v. Doe, 221 So.2d 663 (La.
App. 4th Cir. 1969). There, a couple was struck by a hit-and-run automobile
while the boy was unlocking the car door and the girl was waiting for the
door to be opened. The court found that the boy was occupying the car, as
defined in the policy, but the girl was not. While the Interpretation was for
the purpose of deciding whether the coverage was excess or concurrent,
rather than whether any coverage was extended, the decision shows the
court's willingness to draw a fine line of distinction. Thus, two people who
were standing close to each other were found to fit into different categories.
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A second requirement for recovery is that the party must
prove he is legally entitled to recover from the uninsured mo-
torist.1 8 Since this issue involves all the elements of an ordinary
negligence action, it can be said that if the insured would be un-
able to obtain a judgment against the uninsured motorist, he
cannot recover from his own insurer.1 4 Thus, negligence, con-
tributory negligence, last clear chance, and other such doctrines
are considered in making this legal determination.15 However,
the insured does not have to actually obtain a judgment against
the uninsured motorist, nor must he make the uninsured mo-
torist a party to the suit against the insurer.1
In addition to proving coverage and the legal right to re-
cover from the uninsured motorist, the burden is on the insured
to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the offending
automobile was uninsured.17 Under the usual policy definition
of uninsured automobiles, 8 there are three situations in which
the uninsured motorist provision applies: (1) where there is no
applicable bodily injury liability insurance policy; (2) where
there is an applicable insurance policy but the company writing
the policy has denied coverage; or (3) where the offending ve-
hicle is a hit-and-run automobile.' 9 The statute further provides
While this result accords with the proverbial saying that the line has to be
drawn somewhere, it seems extremely unfair to make such a tenuous dis-
tinction.
13. Botsay v. Campanella, 224 So.2d 107 (La. App. 4th Mr. 1969); Box v.
Doe, 221 So.2d 666 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1969); Rogers v. State Farm Mut. Auto.
Ins. Co., 217 So.2d 690 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1969); McCrory v. Allstate Ins. Co.,
194 So.2d 759 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1967); Hernandez v. State Farm Mut. Auto.
Ins. Co., 192 So.2d 679 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1966). It is important to note that
the insured need only be legally entitled to recover; he does not have to ob-
tain an actual judgment against the uninsured motorist.
14. "It Is therefore clear that before the insured can recover from his
Insurer under the uninsured motorist clause he must first be legally entitled
to recover from the uninsured motorist." McCrory v. Allstate Ins. Co., 194
So.2d 759, 762 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1967).
15. See note 13 supra.
16. Lawrence v. Continental Ins. Co., 199 So.2d 398 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1967).
17. Bullock v. Perry, 238 So.2d 796 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1970); Dalton v.
Allstate Ins. Co., 234 So.2d 455 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1970); Manuel v. American
Employers Ins. Co., 212 So.2d 527 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1968); Vitrano v. State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 198 So.2d 922 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1967).
18. A recent case has held that the term "uninsured automobile" includes
a motorcycle. Thibodeaux v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 242 So.2d 112 (La.
App. 3d Cir. 1970).
19. The standard provision states: "'[Ulninsured highway vehicle' means:
"(a) a highway vehicle with respect to the ownership, maintenance or
use of which there Is, in at least the amounts specified by the financial re-
sponsibility law of the state in which the Insured highway vehicle Is princi-
pally garaged, no bodily Injury liability bond or Insurance policy applicable
at the time of the accident with respect to any person or organization legally
responsible for the use of such vehicle or with respect to which there is a
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that the vehicle is considered uninsured when the liability insurer
providing coverage on that vehicle becomes insolvent. 20 As pre-
viously stated, the burden is on the insured to prove that the
automobile was uninsured. 21 Where the question is one of the
coverage afforded an offending vehicle under an existing policy,
the inquiry is whether or not the particular provisions of that
policy have been satisfied. 22 Proof that there is no policy in
existence is another matter. The courts had initially placed an
extremely heavy burden of proof on the insured, virtually re-
quiring the alleged uninsured motorist to testify to the fact that
he had no insurance.23 However, the statute was amended in
1970 to add an evidentiary provision.24 Basically, the amend-
ment provides that prima facie proof that neither the owner nor
operator had insurance coverage on the vehicle may be obtained
through the introduction of (1) affidavits of the owner and op-
erator of the alleged uninsured vehicle that there was no auto-
mobile liability insurance policy covering the vehicle and (2)
the introduction of an affidavit of an official of the Casualty and
Surety Division that neither the owner nor operator had an
automobile liability insurance policy. The burden of proving
the existence and coverage of a policy then shifts to the insurer.
This amendment provides a simple method of proving that there
is no insurance policy applicable without allowing the insured
an unfair advantage over the insurer.
Hit-and-Run Coverage
The statutory provisions do not specifically deal with a hit-
and-run vehicle, but the definition of "uninsured automobile"
bodily injury liability bond or insurance policy applicable at the time of the
accident but the company writing the same denies coverage thereunder or
"(b) a hit-and-run automobile . . ." N. RISJORD & J. AUSTIN, AUTOMO-
Bnm. LiABIITY INSURANCE CASES 290 (Supp. 1967).
20. LA. R.S. 22:1406D(2), (3) (Supp. 1962); Alleman v. Employers Liability
Assurance Corp., 253 So.2d 688 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1971).
21. Such a burden is on the insured in all suits on insurance policies.
"[T]he burden in an action on an insurance contract is on the plaintiff to
establish every fact in issue which is essential to his cause of action, and
that his claim is within the policy coverage." Macaluso v. Watson, 188 So.2d
178, 179 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1966).
22. Guidry v. Rhodes, 238 So.2d 248 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1970); Buswell v.
Biles, 205 So.2d 165 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1968); Hartzog v. Eubanks, 200 So.2d
303 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1967).
23. Bullock v. Perry, 238 So.2d 796 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1970); Dalton v.
Allstate Ins. Co., 234 So.2d 455 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1970); Vitrano v. State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 198 So.2d 922 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1967).
24. LA. R.S. 22:1406D(6) (Supp. 1970), added by La. Acts 1970, No. 345,
§ 1; Jordan v. Great American Ins. Co., 248 So.2d 363 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1971).
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commonly used in automobile liability policies does include a
hit-and-run automobile. 25 By including in the definition of an
uninsured automobile a hit-and-run vehicle, the imposition on
the claimant of a well nigh impossible burden of proof, where
neither the owner nor operator is identified, is obviated. How-
ever, it has been held that this easing of the burden goes beyond
the statute and is therefore to be strictly construed.
26
The hit-and-run provisions do not apply unless there is phys-
ical contact with the insured or an automobile he is occupying
and the identity of neither the owner nor the operator of the
offending vehicle can be ascertained. 27 In addition, the insured
must report the accident within 24 hours,28 file an oath with the
insurer within 30 days, and allow the insurer to inspect his auto-
mobile. 29 The courts have required that physical contact be
proven on the basis that the hit-and-run provision clearly and
unambiguously requires such proof, notwithstanding the argu-
ment that the purpose of the requirement is to prevent false
claims and, therefore, the requirements of proof should not be
applied when the claim is clearly valid.80 As long as the courts
25. See note 19 supra.
26. See Collins v. New Orleans Public Serv., Inc., 234 So.2d 270, 273 (La.
App. 4th Cir. 1970), in which it was held: "The hit-and-run provisions do go
beyond the statute in that under the latter alone the insured in every in-
stance bears the burden of proving the uninsured automobile was In fact
uninsured, while the policy provisions dispense with the necessity of such
proof by the insured . .. ."
27. The standard provision states: "'[H]it-and-run vehicle' means a high-
way vehicle which causes bodily injury to an insured arising out of physi-
cal contact of such vehicle with the insured or with a vehicle which the
insured is occupying at the time of the accident, provided:
"(a) there cannot be ascertained the identity of either the operator or
owner of such highway vehicle;
"(b) the insured or someone on his behalf shall have reported the acci-
dent within 24 hours to a police, peace or judicial officer or to the Commis-
sioner of Motor Vehicles, and shall have filed with the company within 30
days thereafter a statement under oath that the insured or his legal repre-
sentative has a cause or causes of action arising out of such accident for
damages against a person or persons whose identity is unascertainable, and
setting forth the facts in support thereof; and
"(c) at the company's request, the insured or his legal representative
makes available for inspection the vehicle which the insured was occupying
at the time of the accident . . ." N. RISJORD & J. AUSTIN, AUTOMOBILz LIA-
BIIATY INSURANCE CASES 289 (Supp. 1967).
28. Apparently the report to the police within 24 hours is sufficient, and
the insured does not have to conduct an investigation of his own. Box v.
Doe, 221 So.2d 666 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1969).
29. See note 27 supra.
30. Collins v. New Orleans Public Serv., Inc., 234 So.2d 270 (La. App. 4th
Cir. 1970); Roloff v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 191 So.2d 901 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1966).
COMMENTS
view the coverage as being beyond that required by the statute,
they will presumably uphold the requirement of physical contact.
A recent case has held that the hit-and-run provisions do not
apply if the owner is identified, regardless of the fact that the
operator remains unidentified.81 There the insured was hit by a
car whose driver fled after the wreck. Papers in the car iden-
tified the owner, but it was found that the owner's policy did not
provide coverage because the operator was driving without the
owner's permission. Despite this fact, and the fact that the op-
erator was never identified, the court construed the policy pro-
visions literally and refused to allow the insured to recover under
his uninsured motorist provisions.
The two limitations of the uninsured motorist provision
which seem clearly inconsistent with the purpose of this coverage
are the requirement of physical contact and the requirement that
the identity of neither the owner nor the operator be ascer-
tained. If the circumstances in a given case fail to meet either
of these requirements, the insured will be left with no compen-
sation for his injuries. However, since the easing of the burden
under the hit-and-run coverage goes beyond the statute, either
the policy provisions will have to be voluntarily modified to
provide coverage in such cases or the statute will have to be
amended to require such coverage. Either method would provide
needed relief to an injured person who has no recourse against
any insurer other than his own.
Prescription
The question of the prescriptive period applicable to the
claim of an insured under the uninsured motorist clause initially
occasioned a division of opinion as to whether the action was to
be considered ex contractu or ex delicto. However, the Louisiana
Supreme Court, in the companion cases of Booth v. Fireman's
Fund Insurance Co. 2 and Thomas v. Employers Mutual Fire In-
surance Co.,88 settled the issue by deciding that the action is ex
contractu and, therefore, prescribes in 10 years.34 The contrary
view was undoubtedly based on the belief that since the chain
31. Frazier v. Jackson, 231 So.2d 629 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1970).
32. 253 La. 521, 218 So.2d 680 (1968).
33. 253 La. 531, 218 So.2d 584 (1968).
34. The prescriptive period for contracts is 10 years as provided by
LA. CIV. CODM art. 3544.
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of events leading to the suit was initiated by a delict, the pre-
scriptive period applicable to actions in tort should apply.3 5
However, the uninsured motorist provisions do not provide in-
surance for the uninsured motorist, but rather protect the inno-
cent insured from being left with no means of compensation for
his injuries.
The problem of whether the period should run from the date
of the accident or from the date on which the insured first learns
of the lack of insurance protection has not been decided. Never-
theless, in view of the fact that a 10-year prescriptive period is
applicable, using the date of the accident should afford ample
protection to the claimant.
A difficulty arises from the fact that suits by the insured
against his insurer prescribe in 10 years, while tort suits against
the uninsured motorist prescribe in one year.8 6 Thus, if an in-
sured does not sue his own insurer within one year after the
accident, the insurer's subrogation suit against the uninsured
motorist might be barred by the one-year prescriptive period ap-
plicable to torts. If so, an insurer would be deprived of its op-
portunity to recover against the person ultimately responsible."7
As yet, the problem has not been presented in any reported Lou-
isiana case. Perhaps the best solution to this problem would be
to hold that prescription does not commence against the insurer
until the insurer has a valid cause of action. The valid cause of
action would only accrue when the insurer has been forced to
pay the insured and is, thereby, subrogated to the insured's rights
against the uninsured motorist. Such a solution seems quite fair
and has been utilized in Louisiana in other areas of the law.a8
Who Pays?-Insurer v. Uninsured Motorist
In the automobile accident field there are a multitude of
possible parties and resulting relationships. One of the relation-
35. Id. art. 3536 provides a one-year prescriptive period for tort actions.
36. The uninsured motorist would be liable ex delicto under id. art. 2315,
and thus the one-year prescriptive period would control.
87. LA. R.S. 22:1406D(4) (Supp. 1962) allows the insurer to recover what
it has paid the insured from the proceeds of a settlement or through judg-
ment against the uninsured motorist.
38. See Minyard v. Curtis Products, Inc., 251 La. 624, 205 So.2d 422 (1967),
discussed in The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1967-1968
Term-Obligations, 29 LA. L. REv. 200 (1969). The theory of contra non valen-
tern might also be applicable in this situation. Under this doctrine prescrip-
tion does not run against certain persons who are unable to bring an action.
Reynolds v. Batson, 11 La. Ann. 729 (1856).
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ships which gives rise to many problems is that of the insurer-
uninsured motorist. Obviously, the insurer and the uninsured
motorist are not joint tortfeasors, as the insurer's obligation
arises ex contractu, while the uninsured motorist's obligation
arises ex delicto. The Louisiana Civil Code provides that in solido
obligations are not to be presumed, but arise only through ex-
press agreement of the parties or by operation of law.89 The in-
surer and the uninsured motorist have not expressly agreed to
be bound in solido, nor are they liable in solido as joint tort-
feasors. Finally, since the uninsured motorist statute does not
impose solidary liability, no law operates to bind them.40 Thus,
there appears to be no basis for liability in solido, notwithstand-
ing that the claimant might have a cause of action against both
the insurer and the uninsured motorist to recover for his injuries.
It is submitted that the liability should be described as in solidum
or an imperfect solidarity. This principle has been discussed in
an earlier issue of this Review and is therefore not presented
here.41
If both the insurer and the uninsured motorist are sued suc-
cessfully, it seems that judgment should be rendered for the
insured against both his insurer and the uninsured motorist to
the extent of the liability incumbent upon each of them. The
insurer should then be granted its statutory right to the proceeds
of the judgment rendered against the uninsured motorist, but
only to the extent it has paid the insured.42 When a judgment
against an uninsured motorist exceeds the insurer's policy lim-
its,48 the question arises as to whether the insured has his whole
39. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2093: "An obligation in solido is not presumed; it
must be expressly stipulated.
"This rule ceases to prevail only in cases where an obligation in solido
takes place of right by virtue of some provisions of the law."
40. Joint tortfeasors would be bound in solido under id. art. 2324, which
provides: "He who causes another person to do an unlawful act, or assists
or encourages in the commission of it, is answerable, in solido, with that
person for the damage caused by such act."
41. See The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1966-1967
Term-Insurance, 28 LA. L. Rv. 372 (1968) for the explanation of this theory.
The dissent in Gautreaux v. Pierre, 254 So.2d 476, 479 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1971)
also discussed this theory.
42. See LA. R.S. 22:1406D(4) (Supp. 1962).
43. E.g., where the policy limit is $5,000 and the judgment is for $15,000.
The issue posed Is whether the proceeds from the judgment should go first
toward satisfying the $10,000 remaining of the insured's claim, or first to-
ward reimbursing the insurer, with the remainder going to the insured.
Obviously, the only Instance in which this controversy will arise is where
the uninsured motorist does not have sufficient assets to satisfy the entire
judgment, yet can contribute some amount.
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claim satisfied first or whether the insurer first receives what it
has paid, with the insured receiving the remainder. This issue
remains unanswered. It would seem most desirable to allow
an insured to fully recover before an insurer could collect. In
addition to the desire to see the victim made as nearly whole as
possible, there is the fact that the insurer has received adequate
premiums to provide protection against uninsured motorists and
hence, should not be allowed any preference over the insured.
Who Pays-Insurer v. Insurer Where Both Provide Uninsured
Motorist Coverage
The relationships become more complicated when there are
two or more insurers involved, each providing uninsured motor-
ist coverage. Under the standard "other insurance" clause,44 de-
signed to take care of such situations, the initial determination
is whether the insurer provides excess or primary insurance
coverage. The insurer provides only excess insurance when the
insured is occupying a vehicle which is not owned by the named
insured, but which is covered by a similar policy providing pri-
mary coverage. In all other situations the insurer provides pri-
mary coverage.
If the insurer provides only excess insurance, the insurer
is liable only for the amount by which its policy limit exceeds
the policy limit of the insurer which has provided primary
coverage.45 Thus if the excess insurer's policy limit is $10,000
and the primary insurer's limit is $5,000, the excess insurer will
be liable only for the excess $5,000. However, when the two
policies have the same limits, the courts hold that there is no
44. "E. Other Insurance.
"With respect to bodily injury to an insured while occupying a highway
vehicle not owned by the named insured, this Insurance shall apply only
as excess Insurance over any other similar Insurance available to such in-
sured and applicable to such vehicle as primary insurance, and this insur-
ance shall then apply only in the amount by which the limit of liability for
this coverage exceeds the applicable limit of liability of such other insurance.
Except as provided In the foregoing paragraph, if the insured has other
similar insurance available to him and applicable to the accident, the dam-
ages shall be deemed not to exceed the higher of the applicable limits of
liability of this insurance and such other insurance, and the company shall
not be liable for a greater proportion of any loss to which this coverage
applies than the limit of liability hereunder bears to the sum of the appli-
cable limits of liability of this insurance and such other Insurance." N.
RieJORD & J. AuSTIN, AUTOMOBILE LIABILITY INSURANCE CASEs 292 (Supp. 1967).
45. Id.
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excess and, hence, the excess insurer is liable for nothing.4
However, an earlier case reached a slightly different result in
a similar fact situation.47 In that case the insured sustained in-
juries far exceeding the $3,000 he recovered from the uninsured
motorist insurer of the car in which he was a passenger. Since
that insurer and the insured's own uninsured motorist insurer
had the same policy limits ($5,000), a strict construction of the
excess insurance clause would have precluded any coverage.
However, upon suing his own uninsured motorist insurer, the
insured received an additional $2,000 (giving him a total recovery
of $5,000-his policy limit). While the case does not strictly
apply the other insurance clause, the result reached certainly
seems desirable.
Usually, when two insurers provide primary insurance, each
is bound for a pro rata amount.4 Thus, each would be liable
for that proportion of the damages which its policy limit bears
to the sum of limits of all policies providing protection. Thus
if there were two insurers each providing a $5,000 limit, each
would be liable for one-half of the damages. However, the courts
have upheld that portion of the other insurance clause which
provides that damages would not be deemed to exceed the higher
of the limits of the applicable policies. This means that in a case
such as the example above the damages would be deemed not
to exceed $5,000. Hence, each insurer would be liable for a max-
imum of only $2,500 regardless of whether the actual damages
exceeded the $5,000 total.49 Because each insurer contracted sep-
arately to provide the stated coverage, they would be bound
severally rather than in solido.50
In a recent case, a difficulty arose when the insured sued
46. Broussard v. Whitaker, 238 So.2d 228 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1970); Long
v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 236 So.2d 521 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1970); Jackson
v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 235 So.2d 621 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1970);
Rolling v. Miller, 223 So.2d 723 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1970); Lott v. Southern
Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co., 223 So.2d 492 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1969).
47. LeBlanc v. Allstate Ins. Co., 194 So.2d 791 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1967);
Note, 28 LA. L. REv. 130 (1967).
48. See note 44 supra.
49. Deane v. McGee, 253 So.2d 655 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1971); Bailes v.
Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co., 252 So.2d 123 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writs
granted, 253 So.2d 791 (La. 1971); Graham v. American Cas. Co., 244 So.2d
372 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writs granted, 257 La. 982, 244 So.2d 856 (1971). The
supreme court opinion in the Graham case will be of great importance.
50. Fremin v. Collins, 194 So.2d 470 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1967); The Work
of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1966-1967 Term-Insurance, 28 LA-
L. REv. 372, 374 (1968).
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only one of his two uninsured motorist insurers, although both
provided primary coverage. 51 The court held that the party sued
could not bring the other insurer into the suit through a third
party demand. Under that decision the insurer sued is placed
in the difficult position of being unable to make the other insurer
a party to the suit, in order to give effect to the usual pro rata
provisions. It is submitted that the insurer could use the policy
provisions to have the insured include the other insurer as a
co-defendant.5 2 However, should this theory not succeed, it is
suggested that the statute should be amended.5 3
Recovery for Damages Caused by Joint Tortfeasors-One In-
sured, One Uninsured
Another problem arises when the insured is injured by two
negligent motorists, one of whom is insured and one of whom
is not. Simply stated, the question is whether the presence of
the insured motorist relieves the necessity for recovery against
the uninsured motorist carrier. The court, in Fouquier v. Travel-
ers Insurance Co.,54 held that the presence of the negligent in-
sured motorist removed the necessity for applying the uninsured
motorist provisions because the statute was designed to protect
the insured where his only recourse is against an uninsured
motorist. However, it should be noted that the court stressed
that the negligent motorist's insurance was sufficient to cover
51. Fremin v. Collins, 194 So.2d 470 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1967).
52. An insurer should be able to use the clause requiring the assistance
and cooperation of the insured to force the insured to make the other insurer
a defendant. Admittedly the clause is directed mainly to the uninsured
motorist rather than an insurer, but the result would be desirable. The
standard assistance and cooperation clause provides: "After notice of claim
under this insurance, the company may require the insured to take such
action as may be necessary or appropriate to preserve his right to recover
damages from any person or organization alleged to be legally responsible
for the bodily injury; and in any action against the company, the company
may require the insured to join such person or organization as a party de-
fendant." N. RISJORD & J. AUSTIN, AUTOMOBILE LIABILITY INSURANCE CASES 291
(Supp. 1967). As a practical matter, an insured should always desire to have
all his insurers as defendants. The plaintiff in the Fremin case reflected
this by amending his petition to include the other insurer.
53. The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Court& for the 1966-1967 Term-
Insurance, 28 LA. L. REv. 372, 374 (1968).
54. 204 So.2d 400 (La. App. 1st. Cir. 1967). This case was cited as authority
for this point in both Gautreaux v. Pierre, 254 So.2d 476 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1971) and Strother v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 238 So.2d 774 (La.
App. 1st Cir. 1970). In both cases the insured tortfeasor's policy was suffi-
cient to cover the damages.
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the judgment. 55 Thus, if the insured's judgment far exceeds the
policy limits of the negligent motorist's insurance, the court might
very well hold the uninsured motorist insurer liable in order to
maximize the insured's recovery. Therefore, although the case
reflects a proper solution, the result would probably have been
different had the insured's damages exceeded the policy limits
of the insured joint tortfeasor.
Limitations on the Uninsured Motorist Provision
As mentioned previously,56 insurance policies govern the
relationship between the insured and insurer unless there are
superseding statutory or public policy prohibitions. 57 Beyond
such limitations, insurers are free to insert conditions or limits
on their liability. In view of the social purpose of the statute
and the absence of arm's length negotiating in the area of insur-
ance, it would seem logical that the courts would be especially
watchful over clauses which impose limits or conditions on the
insured's coverage. Accordingly, the courts have struck down
several clauses to prevent defeat of the purpose of the uninsured
motorist statute. One provision which the courts have found
repugnant to the statute's purpose is the clause providing for
compulsory arbitration. This provision has been declared in-
valid58 on the ground that it deprives the Louisiana courts of
jurisdiction of an action against the insurer.59 An amendment to
the statute now prohibits such compulsory arbitration clauses.6 0
However, it should be noted that arbitration at the option of the
insured is still valid.6 ' Further, it has been held that an insured
who demands arbitration under a voluntary provision cannot
later sue the insurer on the policy.62 So, while the insured can-
55. "We are of the opinion that when an uninsured motorist is solidarily
liable with an insured motorist, and the insurance in effect is valid, enforce-
able and sufficient to cover the judgment realized by the plaintiff, there is
no necessity for bringing into play the provisions of the uninsured motorist
provisions in the policy." (Emphasis added.) Fouquier v. Travelers Ins. Co.,
204 So.2d 400, 403 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1967).
56. See note 7 supra.
57. LA. Civ. COE art. 1.901: "Agreements legally entered into have the
effect of laws on those who have formed them. They can not be revoked,
unless by mutual consent of the parties, or for causes acknowledged by law.
They must be performed with good faith."
58. Spillman v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 179 So.2d 454 (La.
App. 3d Cir. 1965); Macaluso v. Watson, 171 So.2d 755 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1965).
59. See LA. R.S. 22:629A(2) (1950).
60. LA. R.S. 22:1406D(5) (Supp. 1964).
61. Id.
62. Bergeron v. Gassen, 185 So.2d 106 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1966).
1972]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
not be forced to arbitrate, once he decides to arbitrate he is
bound by that decision.
Various clauses have also been held invalid because of the
manner in which they were applied. The clause requiring assis-
tance and cooperation of the insured has been held invalid to
the extent that it requires the claimant to join the uninsured
motorist as a party. 3 While the court recognized the desirability
of the requirement, it was held invalid because it denied "the
Louisiana insured the benefit of a practical remedy in Louisiana
courts .... ,,64 Also, the courts have invalidated a clause which
excluded coverage if the offending vehicle was owned by a mu-
nicipality, 65 reasoning that the phrase "any motor vehicle" in the
statute would not allow such an exclusion.16
Three other clauses have fared better with the courts. First,
it has been held that coverage is forfeited where the insured has
violated the policy provisions against making a settlement with-
out written consent of the insurer. 7 Since the insurer has the
statutory right to recover from the uninsured motorist, 8 a policy
provision prohibiting the insured from diminishing this right is
perfectly valid. Furthermore, where the insured has refused to
furnish medical reports or sign authorizations for obtaining
these, as required by the policy, the courts have refused re-
covery. 9 Finally, it has been held that a policy may validly
prohibit a collision insurer from recovering from the uninsured
motorist insurer the sum it has paid under its collision coverage.70
The holding is sound both because the uninsured motorist cover-
age is intended to protect the insured, not another insurer, and
because coverage extends only to bodily injury, not to property
damage.
Several clauses in the coverage allow the insured to deduct
certain disbursements from the amount which it must pay. At
63. Lawrence v. Continental Ins. Co., 199 So.2d 398 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1967).
64. Id. at 399.
65. Powell v. Allstate Ins. Co., 233 So.2d 38 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1970).
66. LA. R.S. 22:1406D(1) (Supp. 1962).
67. Griffin v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 189 So.2d 324 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1966);
LaBove v. American Employers Ins. Co., 189 So.2d 315 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1966).
68. LA. R.S. 22:1406D(4) (Supp. 1962).
69. LeBlanc v. Davis, 254 La. 439, 223 So.2d 862 (1969); Martin v. Starke,
208 So.2d 723 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1968); Pappas v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 191
So.2d 658 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1966).
70. Phillips v. Garden, 211 So.2d 735 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1968).
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present a conflict exists among the courts as to whether the
insurer should be allowed to deduct payments made under the
medical payments coverage of the policy, with some courts al-
lowing the deduction 1 and other courts refusing it.72 Appar-
ently, the purpose of the clause is to prevent a double recovery
of medical expenses by the insured. Therefore, it appears that the
deduction should be allowed only where damages are less than
the policy limit, because here there is a danger of double re-
covery. On the other hand, where the damages exceed the policy
limit, there is no danger of a double recovery; hence, the deduc-
tion should not be allowed.
In a recent case,78 the Second Circuit overruled its prior
decision74 which had allowed the insurer to deduct payments
the insured had received under the workmen's compensation
act. The court reasoned that the deduction violated the statutory
requirement that the policy provide minimum coverage. Were
the deduction allowed, the insured would receive less than the
minimum coverage and the insurer would benefit unjustly from
the insured's receipt of workmen's compensation payments.
Conclusion
The uninsured motorist coverage affords desirable protection
to the person injured by an uninsured motorist. However, added
protection, perhaps in the form of a statutory amendment, is
needed to better protect the victims of a hit-and-run vehicle.
Nevertheless, it appears that the statute and the individual poli-
cies have been interpreted fairly to protect both the insured
and the insurer.
Edwin K. Theus, Jr.
71. Bailes v. Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co., 252 So.2d 123 (La. App.
3d Cir.), writs granted, 253 So.2d 791 (La. 1971); Connelley v. Southern Farm
Bureau Cas. Co., 219 So.2d 206 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1969); Morgan v. State
Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 195 So.2d 648 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1967).
72. Bunch v. Frezier, 239 So.2d 680 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1970); Taylor v.
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 237 So.2d 690 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1970).
73. Williams v. Buckelew, 246 So.2d 58 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1971).
74. Allen v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 188 So.2d 741 (La. App.
2d Cir.), wit refused, 249 La. 743, 190 So.2d 909 (1966).
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